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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
E.K. GREENWALD,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

DEPUTY CLERK
FULTON C~~ETYRIOR COURT
GA

)

)

~

)

STEVEN A. ODOM, MARTIN KIDDER,
AND MARK DUNAWAY,

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 2008-CV-154834

)
)
)
)

Defendants.
-------------

)
)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On January 19, 2011, counsel appeared before this Court to present oral argument on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. After hearing the arguments made by counsel, and
reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion and the record in the case, the Court finds as
follows:
Facts:
Mr. E.K. Greenwald ("Greenwald") sued Mr. Steven A. Odom ("Odom"), Mr. Martin

Kidder ("Kidder") and Mr. Mark Dunaway ("Dunaway") for alleged misrepresentations in
connection with his purchase for $2,040,000 through a private subscription (the "Transaction")
of3,000,000 shares (and 2.25 million warrants to purchase additional shares) in Verso
Technologies, Inc. ("Verso"), a Minnesota telecommunications corporation that filed for
bankruptcy protection on April 28, 2008.
Odom was Verso's CEO, Kidder was Verso's CFO, and Dunaway was Verso's COO.
The record shows that Greenwald was a retired professor, with a Ph.D in engineering physics.
He was an experienced investor, familiar with the telecommunications industry, and at the time
of the Transaction, Greenwald already owned 165,000 shares of Verso stock through earlier
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purchases on the open market. Prior to the Transaction, Kidder furnished Greenwald with a
Confidential Information Memorandum, a Subscription Agreement, and an Investor Questionaire
(collectively, the "Offering Documents"). On or about August 20,2007, Greenwald met with
Odom and Dunaway to discuss the pending Transaction and Verso's business prospects. On
September 5,2007, Greenwald executed an acknowledgment ofthe terms of the Offering
Documents.
Greenwald asserts claims for common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
securities fraud under Georgia law. Specifically, Greenwald alleges that Odom and Dunaway
made oral misrepresentations during the meetings on August 20, 2007, and that the Offering
Documents failed to adequately disclose material information.

Standard:
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56
when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that
the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary
judgment as a matter oflaw. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). The
moving party need only eliminate one essential element of a party's claim to prevail on summary
judgment. Real Estate Int'l Inc. v. Buggay, 220 Ga. App. 449, 451 (1996).
Under Georgia law, "fraud has five elements: (1) false representation by a defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) justifiable reliance
by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to the plaintiff" Bogle v. Bragg, 248 Ga. App. 632,634 (2001).
Negligent misrepresentation has three elements: "(1) the defendant's negligent supply of false
information to foreseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such persons' reasonable reliance
upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance."
Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc. 267 Ga. 424, 426 (1997).
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claim for securities fraud under Georgia law has five elements: "1) a misstatement or omission,
2) of a material fact, 3) made with scienter, 4) on which plaintiff relied, 5) that proximately
caused his injury." Keogler v. Krasnoff, 268 Ga. App. 250, 254 (2004). Thus, reliance is an
element common to all of Greenwald's claims.
Oral Misrepresentations of Odorn and Dunaway:

Greenwald concedes that Kidder made no misrepresentation that induced him to enter
into the Transaction. Thus, the only alleged oral misrepresentations at issue concern statements
made by Dunaway and Odom during meetings held on August 20,2007. During those meetings,
Greenwald contends that Dunaway and Odom made certain representations about Verso's
projected sales revenue and future financial condition. Specifically, Greenwald alleges that
Dunaway represented that Verso's 2008 revenue would exceed $75 million, based on contracts
or orders "in hand," and that fourth quarter 2007 revenue of$15,000,000 was "all but a done
deal." According to Greenwald, Odom also stated that fourth quarter 2007 would be EBITDA
neutral or positive and that Verso would be EBITDA positive all though 2008. As it turns out,
these financial projections fell short, and Verso filed for bankruptcy on April 28, 2008.
Greenwald also attributes to Odom representations that Verso would sell its NetPerformer
division in the fourth quarter 0 f 2007 and that Verso was not considering any further
acquisitions. In fact, Verso ultimately acquired a company in the fourth quarter of2007, instead
of selling NetPerformer.
The Court finds that these statements about Verso's projected revenue and future plans to
sell or acquire assets cannot provide a basis for Greenwald's claims because they are
representations as to future events. "A misrepresentation presupposes knowledge of the falsity
ofthe representation and does not include representations as to future acts or events." Gross v.
Ideal Pool Corp., 181 Ga. App. 483, 485 (1987). Even if the Court were persuaded by
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Greenwald's argument that Dunaway's and Odom's statements also contained misleading
information about CUlTent events, Greenwald's reliance on such statements is negated by the
merger clause contained in the SUbscription Agreement, as more particularly set forth below.
The only alleged misrepresentation that did not involve a future business prospect or
fmancial projection was Odom's statement, in response to a question from Greenwald about the
status of Verso's CUlTent debt, that "there was nothing but the normal, daily, operational type
debts" in addition to certain known secured debt facilities. According to Greenwald, Verso held
past due trade payables that were not identified as past due amounts. The record, however,
shows that Verso's annual report disclosed that it had $11 million in payables owed before the
end of2007 and almost $21 million in debt payable by the end of2009. Moreover, the risk
factors provide that as of "June 30,2007, [Verso] had an accumulated deficit of approximately
$361.2 million" and that Verso's "operations ... are dependent on the Company's ability to secure
additional fmancing; and ... there are no existing alTangements with respect to that financing."
There is no dispute that Greenwald was aware that Verso struggled financially in the past, was
presently short on cash, and that his investment would be used to address cash-flow problems at
Verso. Considering the full context ofthe information made available to Greenwald prior to his
investment, the Court finds that Greenwald had the opportunity to appreciate the true nature of
the risk of the Transaction and cannot show that he was misled to such an extent that it masked
the disclosed risks.

The Merger Clause:
Even if Greenwald could show that Dunaway's and Odom's statements amounted to
material misrepresentations, the Court fmds that Greenwald cannot overcome the merger clause
in the Subscription Agreement, which expressly forecloses Greenwald's right to rely on
representations made outside the Offering Documents. The merger clause provides that "[t]his
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Subscription Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the matter set
forth herein and there are no representations, covenants or other agreements except as stated or
referred to herein or as embodied in the Offering Documents."
The Georgia Supreme Court has clearly directed that "in an ann's length business
transaction, pre-contractual representations are superceded by a valid contractual merger clause."
First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 792 (2001). The Court goes on to explain the
important effect ofa merger clause: "a person who has received written disclosure of the truth
may not claim to rely on contrary oral falsehoods." Id., 273 Ga. at 795.
The Offering Documents contain over nine pages of risks associated with the
Transaction, including the disclosure that Verso's "revenues may decline significantly if any
major patiner cancels or delays a purchase 0 f our products," Verso's "business strategy calls for
growth internally as well as through acquisitions," Verso has "a history of net losses, including
net losses of approximately $6.5 million for the quarter ended June 30,2007, $17.8 million for
the 2006 fiscal year, $20.1 million for the 2005 fiscal year. '" As of June 30, 2007, we had an
accumulated deficit of approximately $361.2 million," and Verso "may not be profitable in the
future." Accordingly, the Court finds that Greenwald was well apprised ofthe risks that form
the substance of his complaints. To the extent that Greenwald is relying on oral statements to
contradict the tenns of the Offering Documents, the merger clause reflects the parties' intention
that the Offering Documents supercede all pre-contractual representations concerning the
Transaction, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the consideration of prior contradictory oral
statements. First Data POS, Inc., 273 Ga. at 794.
Greenwald seeks to overcome the operation of the merger clause by pointing to language
in another provision ofthe Subscription Agreement that he contends pennits the integration of
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Dunaway's and Odom's oral statements into the parties' agreement. The "reliance" clause in the
Subscription Agreement provides that:
The Company has made available to the Subscriber the opportunity to ask
questions of, and receive answers from the Company with respect to the activities
of the Company as described in the Offering Documents, and otherwise to obtain
any additional information ... necessary to verify the accuracy of the information
contained in the Offering Documents.
Considering that the reliance clause expressly limits the solicitation of outside
information to the substance ofthe Offering Documents, the Court is not persuaded that this
language can be construed to effectively permit the integration of contradictory oral
representations into the terms of the parties' written agreement.
Finally, Greenwald attempts to circumvent the operation of the merger clause by arguing
that he is entitled to rescind the Subscription Agreement. In line with the Court's holding in a
related case, see Order in Hawk et at v. Odom, No. 2009cv162588 (Superior Court of Fulton
County July 10, 2009) (Long, J.), the remedy of rescission is not available here where the
defendants are not parties to the Subscription Agreement, which was entered into between
Greenwald and Verso only.

Omissions in the Offering Documents:
There is no dispute that the Offering Documents do not contain material
misrepresentations of fact. But Greenwald contends that the Offering Documents omit certain
information that renders the materials misleading and false. Because Kidder assisted Verso's inhouse counsel in the preparation of the Offering Documents, with input from Odom, Greenwald
contends that they are responsible for the alleged omissions contained therein. In particular,
Greenwald argues that the Offering Documents fail to disclose that Verso faced an imminent
threat ofinsolvency and that Verso was at risk oflosing its NASDAQ listing because ofa failure
to meet the minimum shareho lders' equity requirement.
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In fact, the risk factors contained in the Offering Documents contain disclosures, which
include that Verso has "a history oflosses and may not be profitable in the future" and that
Verso's "operations ... are dependent on the Company's ability to secure additional financing;
and ... there are no existing arrangements with respect to that fmancing." Moreover, the Offering
Documents expressly warn of the possibility and consequences of NASDAQ delisting. And the
risk factors identify the only notice Verso received from NASDAQ concerning its failure to
comply with the exchange's listing requirements. Given the degree to which the risk factors
address Greenwald's concerns, the Court tends to agree with Greenwald's own conclusion when
asked in his deposition what additional risks he would add to the Offering Documents: "I
probably wouldn't have said anything more."
In any case, Greenwald's claims of fraud by omission fail for the reason that he has not
established that any defendant had a duty to speak. Actionable fraud may be based on
"[s]uppression ofa material fact which a party is under an obligation to communicate."
O.e.G.A. 23-2-53. "The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of
the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." Id. There is nothing in the record
to show that Greenwald shared a confidential relationship with Odom or Kidder. "Absent a
confidential relationship, no duty to disclose exists between parties in arms-length business
transactions." Lilliston v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 241, 244 (2007). The record reveals that
this case arises from an anns-length business transaction. As Odom and Kidder had no duty to
disclose, Greenwald's fraud by omission claims fail as a matter oflaw.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this 9th day of February, 2011.
~--
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